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Love and Narcissism in Reality Television 
 
Abstract 
Love Island is a reality television series structured as a dating game, where participants compete 
to form romantic relationships. This article puts the show in conversation with theories and 
philosophies of love to draw between them an idea of love as a singular moral event that is 
constrained by cultural imperatives. What emerges is an existential phenomenology of love in 
three parts: first, romantic love is framed as an opening on to moral life; then, it is argued that 
moral life is enacted through a love for the neighbour that constitutes and animates our being 
in the world; and finally, it is shown that narcissism is not straightforwardly a negative 
condition but a balancing force in moral life. The article concludes with reflections on what 
this conceptual work might offer to analyses of relationships played out on reality television. 
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Love Island is a combination of dating game and Big Brother-style reality television, where 
participants compete to find love and win a share of a cash prize – and lucrative exposure. The 
competition starts out with equal numbers of men and women who initially partner up based 
on first impressions and according to a heteronormative idea of relationships. Each week one 
member of every couple has the power to stick with their partner or recouple with someone 
else, whilst new contestants join the Island to tempt others to stray. There are weekly evictions 
based on viewer polls, Islander votes or being left single after recoupling. This carries on until 
four couples remain, with the winners then determined by an audience vote. Love Island has 
been dogged by complaints of tawdriness, exemplified by Barbara Ellen (2018) in the Observer 
who referred to the show as ‘sneak porn’ populated by ‘wannabes’, depicting ‘people in 
swimwear bickering and screaming’, and all ‘to entertain the gawping masses’. Stuart Heritage 
(2018), in the Guardian, characterised the contestants as ‘narcissists’ and described Love Island 
as ‘a petri dish of obnoxious self-adoration’. Tragically, the suicides of two former contestants 
and one former presenter have cast a dark cloud over the series and the scrutiny that comes 
with participation. 
 
Criticisms of Love Island and its participants are often reminiscent of Christopher Lasch’s 
account of diminishing expectations in The Culture of Narcissism (1991). Lasch sketches the 
figure of an anxious narcissist who seeks to find meaning in life but who rejects the old ideas 
of loyalty and the security of the group; who imagines others to be competitors; who is sexually 
permissive but never at peace; and who is acquisitive but ultimately unsatisfied with their 
instant gratification. Lasch’s narcissist trivialises the past, believing they have nothing to learn 
from it, that it cannot provide a standard by which to discuss the present, but the same cannot 
be said of social theorists of love (see Rusu, 2018), and it is here that we might find the 
beginning of a less moralistic account of Love Island.  
 
In his essay ‘Religious Rejections of the World and their Directions’ Max Weber tells of how 
the ethos of brotherly love as a ‘communism of loving brethren’ (1958: 330) was flattened out 
by the protestant ethic, made less spontaneous and more dutybound, and then co-opted by the 
spirit of capitalism. In Love as Passion (1986) Niklas Luhmann uses systems theory to show 
how we love and suffer by cultural imperatives, an undertaking drawn by two distinct but 
interwoven frameworks: the first marking the transition from traditional to modern societies; 
and the second conceptualising love as a symbolic code that underpins our ability to 
communicate effectively with one another. On the second count, love is understood only 
secondarily as a feeling; first and foremost, it is a symbolic code without which we could not 
demonstrate the appropriate feelings within intimate relationships. Intimate relationships are 
then social systems that are expected to meet the needs of those engaged in them and that 
therefore emphasise individual expectation whilst balancing this with social cohesion. 
Historical approaches are found also in Anthony Giddens’ The Transformation of Intimacy 
(1992) and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s The Normal Chaos of Love (1995), Giddens charting 
the rise of romantic love (in distinction to passionate love) in the late eighteenth century, when 
ideals of freedom and self-realisation became ascendent, and of the pure relationship (that 
exists only to meet the needs of the individuals in them) as ‘a transactional negotiation’ 
(Giddens, 1992: 3), and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim situating love in the individualistic process 
of modernity as a project, where the individual retreats into intimate ties to find meaning and 
security in a life uprooted from existential certainties. Zygmunt Bauman, in his Liquid Love 
(2003), writes of a subject without strong bonds, finding at best loose ties that are not 
guaranteed to last, who turns to personal relationships precisely because of the precariousness 
of these liquefied bonds, but who finds that those relationships have become mere connections, 
more apt for a world where romantic possibilities are meant to accumulate to the individual 
and never diminish in their availability, a consumerist rather than passionate kind of being with 
others. 
 
The worry is that love construed as a culturally specific code ultimately reduces love to a null 
point. Love would then be the communication of norms, it would be about learning and 
participating and formatting a code that structures relationships, as Luhmann says, and whilst 
he adds that love is unstable, that there is always something that is uncommunicated and that 
cannot be grasped, it is precisely this that takes us beyond a code and towards the other. The 
symbolic code would then be a formalisation of love as a way of being that gives meaning to 
the individual before any codification, and a communication, a saying before anything said, 
that founds the intersubjective. The above accounts very usefully give us an idea of love as 
something subject to cultural change, that what love means and what it is meant to provide and 
how it is supposed to be enacted shifts with the times. But for there to be a reckoning of what 
has been lost and what has been gained, it is useful also to understand how these changes 
augment or deviate the intersubjective orientation of our very existence.  
 
Bauman (2003: 3) himself points us in this direction when in Liquid Love he describes love as 
a singular event. Here he signals his earlier and deeper commitment to the moral philosophy 
of Emmanuel Levinas (for example in Bauman, 1993, 1995), and it is this way of understanding 
love and existence that will animate the argument made in this article, namely that love is 
bound up with ethics as an event, an encounter with another being that breaks, momentarily, 
with the normative demands of society that would dictate responsibilities in this direction or 
the other, and that opens the individual completely to its being for the other person. This 
approach, although animated by Levinas, is motivated by Linnell Secomb’s (2007: 3) 
observation that the ‘enactment and depiction of love supplements and disseminates love’s 
possibilities’. Emphasising the event of love, rather than the grander historical narrative of how 
love changes, this article captures love’s reformulation by unpacking and unpicking moments 
of contemporary love on Love Island. In what follows, the focus will be on this idea of love as 
foundational, love in its pre-social state, as an orientation that makes the individual and the 
intersubjective together possible, because without this, the effects of changes in norms or codes 
can only really be logged – and the mourning of loss risks becoming entirely backwards looking 
rather than forwards facing, towards the future and towards the other. Then we would be able 
to make a moral assessment of what programmes like Love Island tell us about the constraints 
and demands of love today without recourse to moralistic sentiment. 
 
In keeping with the idea of love as an encounter, this article then stages an encounter between 
theory and Love Island, not to apply theory or to derive theory, but to put the two in 
conversation, as Secomb does, to reveal what it tells us about the possibilities of love. It focuses 
on events from series four of the show to draw out and situate three problems of love and their 
possibilities: love as possessive union; love as frustrated accumulation; and love as narcissistic 
self-fulfilment. The idea is not to resolve love’s problems, as they are presented on the show, 
but to reveal what they tell us about moral existence, to move beyond moralising about 
participants or formats so we can take stock of the cultural changes – charted by those 
mentioned above and more to come – and find the ways that living lovingly with others is 
altered or diminished. The article then concludes with ideas of how this approach might 






On day one, wildcard Adam, a personal trainer from Newcastle, was tasked with breaking up 
one of the newly formed couples to pick a partner for himself. He chose to split up Niall and 
Kendall but on day four, a new contestant, Rosie, arrived on the Island and Kendall suspected 
that Adam had taken an interest in her. As a result, she started to take things slower. Adam 
told Kendall that she had no reason to doubt him, that her insecurities meant she was too 
scared to let him in, and that he was left making all the effort in the relationship as a result. 
He appeared to break things off with Kendall at the end of this conversation, and then went 
over to Rosie, who he kissed; the show’s narrator clocked the time between these two acts at 
four minutes. Kendall later had second thoughts about the breakup with Adam. Meanwhile, he 
confessed that he liked the fact that she was upset that he had kissed Rosie; he then told Kendall 
that he preferred her being jealous – and she acknowledged that he had pushed her buttons to 
get what he wanted. On day six, Adam recoupled with Rosie and Kendall was evicted from the 
Island. As Adam stated to camera: ‘I know what I want, and I get what I want’. On day sixteen, 
a new contestant, Zara, chose to go on a date with Adam. He reassured Rosie that, although 
Zara was his type, there was nothing between them. Adam then appeared to ignore Rosie, 
something he denied to her by suggesting she was overreacting. He later told a visibly 
distraught Rosie that there had been nothing between him and Zara until she had started 
making a big deal about it. The camera appeared to show Adam smirking as she told him how 
much he had hurt her. He then recoupled with Zara on day twenty, with Rosie later evicted 
after failing to find a new partner. As Rosie reflected: ‘he always thinks he has the power’. 
 
The question of power goes to the heart of the contemporary conceptualisation of love, its 
pursuit of unity and the tendency for one identity to overwhelm the other under cultural norms 
that favour possession. The idea that in love we become one with another appears culturally 
entrenched, reproduced in popular culture and yet lampooned at least as far back as Ancient 
Greece (see Plato, 1997). Levinas (2007: 254) characterises this pursuit of unity as an act of 
egoism; not so much a quest for the other but a journey home, to reside in oneself. He finds 
this unsatisfactory, since it seems to depict love as the simple attainment of a need or desire 
rather than an encounter between two distinct people, arguing instead that the one you love 
must always retain their alterity or else they cease to be something beyond the self to desire at 
all. Levinas (2008c: 86) argues that love is not a fusion, of two complementary entities that 
become a whole, but rather ‘an insurmountable duality of beings’; ‘it is a relationship with 
what always steps away’. There are three useful consequences of thinking of love in the way 
Levinas describes.  
 
First, if the person you love always steps away, in the sense of remaining an independent entity, 
then you must always take a step towards them. This takes us away from a conceptualisation 
of love as ‘the terminus of a movement’, as Levinas (2008a: 29) characterises it – a passive 
relationship or a ‘a calm rest in oneself’ – and keeps it alive as an active intersubjective 
relationship. ‘The very possibility of love’, writes Levinas (2008a: 35), ‘lies in its negativity’, 
which is to say that love is always essentially unfulfilled, a movement towards but never a 
possession of the beloved. The fires of love are then never consumed.  
 
Second, if there is not unity but instead alterity then the other person does not become ours but 
instead ‘withdraws into mystery’ (Levinas, 2008c: 86). By resisting assimilation to my 
possession, the other, mysterious, remains other, never fully worked out, at no time a 
possession of my thought, always holding something back. Levinas argues that love introduces 
transcendence to a being caught up in its own existence. The object of this love is then 
something alluring precisely because it is not a projection or possession of oneself.  
 
Third, this introduction of transcendence opens our eyes to moral experience. An encounter 
with something that resists my possession, is, for Levinas, a moral encounter – ‘arousing my 
goodness’ (Levinas, 2007: 200) – since it reveals an existence that exceeds my experience. 
Whatever exceeds the individual must be met with attentive care precisely because it goes 
beyond what they might have any mastery over. The other person does not, in love, reside 
within me, but responsibility for their existence rests with me before all others. To step towards 
the other person who always steps away is then a moral movement; it is to trace the orientation 
of our being towards the other.  
 
There is a balance to be found in love, between the activation of the ego in the pleasure of being 
loved, and, in loving back, being drawn toward the other – a position beyond solipsism or unity. 
Levinas (2007: 268) call this ‘fecundity’: where the love between lovers is consummated and 
gives birth to the future – a future which is not a future of the same but an openness to alterity 
and to the unknowable. One of the contradictions of love is that, in settling down, we settle for 
a future that can never itself be settled. ‘Commitment is oriented toward the future’, as Eva 
Illouz (2018: 98) notes, ‘but it is a future in which one assumes that one will be and will want 
what one is and one wants in the present time’. This contradiction speaks to the endurance of 
the idea of love as finding unity. The notion that love is the completion of a quest for 
completeness – an idea that seems to underpin the very format of dating shows like Love Island 
– forecloses an understanding of the future as an opening onto the beyond. At its heart is a kind 
of fixing of identities.  
 
Adriana Cavarero (2000: 110) argues that love is something fragile, two unique identities 
exposing themselves to each other, where what we are is less important than who we are – 
where that who is a relational story that is told, and that is heard. Trivialising your partner’s 
thoughts and feelings, telling them the world is this way and not that to distort their experience 
of being in it, or twisting events to place blame on them, suggests, as Rosie seems to encounter 
on Love Island, the negative potential of the idea of love as becoming one. That is, the idea of 
unity is here a unity of the self that has taken possession of the other. Rachel O’Neill (2018: 
38) argues that under the cultural rationality of neoliberalism, love is caught up in the discourse 
of attainment and self-work, or, an entrepreneurialism of the self, and relationships become 
part of ‘self-interested individualism’ such that ‘every aspect of coupledom becomes a matter 
of tactic and strategy’. We might see the negative behaviours depicted on Love Island – such 
as provoking jealousy, telling someone that their perception of events is all in their head or that 
their insecurities or paranoia are a causal factor in events – as a corollary of this self-interested 
individualism incorporating the other person in its purview, such that they become an object of 
self-gratification. It is an exercise of power over the other rather than the recognition of the 
spontaneity or freedom of the other as a limit to one’s power. The pursuit of unity then denies 
the other person their status as a relational subject, with a view on the world of their own, fixing 
them as a ‘what’ and not a ‘who’ – and a ‘what’ can never form a ‘we’. In its extreme form, 
unity in relationships excludes the possibility of difference, of a different interpretation of the 
world or orientation to the future. 
 
For Levinas (2008c: 88), love is completely opposed to possession or power. But in the sort of 
neoliberal culture that O’Neill describes, and that Love Island seems to capture, possession and 
power permeate everything we do. If we valorise the idea that love is unity then we do not just 
lose the vitality of uniqueness in some abstract sense; we risk validating a more possessive kind 
of love – or at least we endorse the condition in which such a possessive love might thrive. 
Scenes of manipulation or control within relationships on programmes such as Love Island 
ought to be contextualised not only within the dynamic of neoliberalisation, but also the way 
that this dynamic accelerates and accentuates the harm of romantic fusion as a cultural totem. 
When love comes to be an act of possession, where one identity overwhelms and then takes 
ownership of the other, then, as Rosie hinted at on the show, the quest for unity has become 
ineluctably a pursuit of power. 
 
Luhmann (1986: 175) observed that love was not about reciprocity or unity but personal 
interpenetration, about finding ‘meaning in the world of someone else’. What a reading of 
Levinas adds here is that the meaning to be found is in the undoing of identity, not in the 
individual’s recombination with the other, but in the movement away from the self and towards 
the other – and towards an unknowable future. As Bauman (2003: 8) notes, Levinas’s rejection 
of unity as possessive, as an act of power over the other, gives us an idea of love whereby the 
‘challenge, the pull, the seduction of the Other render all distance, however reduced and 
miniscule, unbearably large’. Love understood this way would operate according to codes, 
manners and symbols engrained in cultures, but it would also, underneath these, introduce the 
frightening yet radical dimension of moving across the distance between us, a movement that 
for Levinas is fundamentally moral. Bauman hints at this at numerous points in Liquid Love 
when he draws parallels between love and death – for Heidegger, existence was oriented 
towards death; for Levinas, towards the other – but stops short of a fully existential account of 
love. We can say here that love would be bound up with an existence as being towards others, 
as well as then being something constrained or contorted by norms and injunctions. Love as 
being towards the other gives us an idea of love that is more than a null point; it would be the 
very point of life itself. The processes of modernity described by Bauman, or Giddens or Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim, and the acceleration of these by the neoliberalism of life, as outlined by 
O’Neill in the context of love and relationships, then encroach upon and reformulate what love 
communicates, what it means as a cultural value, but not what it achieves – or ought to 





Alex, an A&E doctor from Carmarthen in Wales, coupled up with Samira on day one. They 
soon agreed to be just friends once he realised that she was not that into him. When recoupling 
came around, the two would stay together in an attempt to ensure that neither had to leave the 
Island, but with an understanding that the coupling would end when one or the other found 
someone they wanted to be with. On day four, viewers voted for Alex to go on a date with Rosie. 
This went nowhere and Rosie ended up with Adam. On day eight, a new contestant, Megan, 
arrived on the Island and seemed to take a shine to Alex when she chose to go on a date with 
him. Megan then coupled with Eyal on day ten. Alex’s frustration at not being able to find 
someone to couple up with led him to complain that ‘I feel like I’m a leper or something!’ On 
day sixteen, two more new contestants, Zara and Ellie, picked Alex for a date, and he coupled 
with the latter on day twenty. However, Ellie eventually told him that she was not into him 
romantically – at which point Alex, visibly disgruntled, told her that she had not tried hard 
enough at the relationship and had strung him along. He briefly coupled up with Grace, until 
she was voted off by viewers. Soon after, Alexandra arrived on the Island and chose Alex for a 
date, and the two coupled up on day forty. Three days later, Alex became interested in a new 
contestant, Laura C, but she ultimately coupled with Jack. Alex stayed with Alexandra until 
they were both evicted by public vote on the day before the final, although any romantic aspect 
to the relationship appeared to have broken down, with Alexandra accusing Alex of neglecting 
her feelings and stringing her along. 
 
When an asymmetry of feeling is cast as a kind of frustrated entitlement it seems to go hand in 
hand with the diminishing status afforded to an idea of selfless or charitable love that finds 
itself at odds with a more possessive culture. If love is bound up with moral existence, then it 
is important to note that in the work of Levinas, love and morality are not the same thing – or 
at least, there is distinction to be made between love between lovers and love for the neighbour. 
For Levinas, love between lovers is a reciprocal relationship grounded in enjoyment of the 
other; love for the neighbour is an asymmetrical encounter founded by giving to the other. The 
first is a romance and the second is responsibility. Levinas (2006: 17) writes: ‘To love is to 
exist as if the lover and the loved one were alone in the world’. Carving out this exclusive 
space, where the one lives for this other person, loves this other person more than anyone else, 
is to find enjoyment in the existence of another. This is beautiful, of course, but Levinas argues 
that this does not necessarily afford it the status of a moral relationship, since enjoyment of the 
other activates one’s ego rather than selflessness. But as Jacques Derrida (1999: 41) explains, 
in his reading of Levinas, this kind of exclusive, romantic love is nevertheless bound up with 
moral responsibility even if it does not accomplish it, since it embraces alterity and directs the 
individual towards the other. In any case, this imagined position of lovers – as if alone – is 
quickly dispelled. The closed society of lovers is exploded by love for the neighbour – a kind 
of infidelity of the third. The neighbour as a third party presupposes an infinite number of other 
neighbours with whom one might initiate a singular relationship. This is a kind of love ‘in 
which the ethical aspect dominates the passionate aspect’; it enacts a relationship of 
responsibility, which Levinas (2006: 88) suggests is ‘the harsh name for what we call love of 
one’s neighbour’ – harsh because it signals a movement away from enjoyment and towards 
selflessness.  
 
Three things distinguish love for the neighbour from love between lovers: that it is 
asymmetrical; that it is directed towards frailty; and that it is enacted in giving. First, Levinas 
(2008c: 137) writes that love for the neighbour ‘is without concern for reciprocity: I have to 
respond to and for the Other without occupying myself with the Other’s responsibility in my 
regard’. To expect anything in return is to treat the other without respect for their freedom to 
give or not. Second, this kind of love is directed towards the frailty of the other, a frailty borne 
not in inferiority but in the precious vulnerability of otherness. (For Levinas, otherness refers 
to the mystery or transcendence of the other person, something beyond me that is precious 
precisely because it escapes my grasp.) ‘To love is to fear for another’, says Levinas (2007: 
256), ‘to come to the assistance of his frailty’. Third, Levinas (2008b: 72-74) argues that you 
must enjoy what you give in order to give it with your heart; but in the act of giving, it is no 
longer a gift of the heart but of material care or hospitality. That is, the gift is altered by the 
immediacy or urgency of the encounter with the other; it is no longer grounded in enjoyment 
but in responsibility.  
 
This idea of love for the neighbour is infinite rather than universal. Moral or charitable love is 
intimately enacted and infinitely encountered; it approaches the other person in all their 
uniqueness and is also available to that person and another person and all other people, with 
respect for their uniqueness too – a procession of closed relationships. Love between lovers is 
such a powerful experience not only because we derive enjoyment from it but also because it 
encourages us to decentre ourselves, to go towards the other person, without assimilating the 
other person entirely to our own needs. It orients the individual to the other’s existence, which 
is then fundamental to a love for the neighbour, in which enjoyment is eschewed in favour of 
giving selflessly. Love teaches us to be-with others so that we can be-for others.  
 
A lack of reciprocity in romance is a miserable thing, as Alex discovered, bouncing from one 
rejection to the next on Love Island. Cavarero (2000) argues that loving without being loved is 
so devastating because we expose ourselves without the other appearing; we make ourselves 
vulnerable without any such exposure in return. This is a kind of frailty without relation. When 
you expose yourself without reciprocation, you do not appear to the other in all your 
uniqueness: ‘The one who exhibits herself without appearing to the other remains, 
paradoxically, an unexpressed uniqueness. She remains a what in front of a who’ (Cavarero, 
2000: 113). It is a sadness encompassed by the thought that I do not exist for you. Illouz (2018: 
122-124) explains that we seek social recognition in loving relationships, and in so doing our 
sense of self-worth is vulnerable. Fear of rejection is a social fear because it impacts on our 
sense of value to others. As such, when we see the pain of rejection on shows like Love Island 
we are tapping into a much wider social production of suffering.  
 
O’Neill (2018: 22) argues that the cultural rationality of neoliberalism has cast the attainment 
of relationships as a measure of the individual’s worth, often with gendered connotations that 
lead to the objectification of women’s bodies. Part of this logic is that if you work hard enough 
for something then you ought to be able to achieve it – if only you are entrepreneurial enough 
(O’Neill, 2018: 26). On the show, the participants refer to this as grafting and, taken to its 
logical conclusion, it normalises a sense of entitlement to the other. Sexual relationships, for 
example, have come to be seen as a commodity controlled by women, such that graft is the 
means of procuring the resource (O’Neill, 2018: 35). But the hyper-individualism of the 
entrepreneurial spirit also means that if you fail then you have no-one to blame but yourself, 
which is why rejection might be so hard to face or feel comparable to leprosy – as Alex 
suggested – and why it might be easier to displace this blame to the person who has rebuffed 
your advances. Under a market logic of romance, rejection becomes a kind of social 
bankruptcy. 
 
Illouz (2018: 164-166) notes that unrequited love was a virtue back when love was still 
enchanted but that today romantic suffering is seen as unacceptable or unjustifiable. Love has 
become bound to self-interest such that unreciprocated love is regarded as a bad investment 
rather than something valuable. To love someone who does not love you back would then be a 
form of self-harm – something pathological – for which you would be expected to seek therapy. 
‘Love’, writes Illouz (2018: 197), ‘has lost its cultural pathos’. In saying that, we should not 
want to valorise unrequited love as a sort of vale of soul making, where our own individual 
romantic suffering is seen as something noble or essential, nor to face backwards wholly in 
mourning a certain loss.  
 
On the first count, the idea of suffering for love is inconsistent with love as moral existence if 
it directs attention towards the self and not towards the other. ‘Suffering in its woe, in its spite 
of consciousness’, writes Levinas (2006: 79), ‘is passivity’; ‘the least one can say about 
suffering is that, in its own phenomenality, intrinsically, it is useless’. The trick is neither to 
see rejection as a form of frustrated possession nor to valorise romantic pain. If the experience 
of romantic love allows us to adopt a stance towards existence that is open to the other, then 
the experience of frustrated love ought to guide us right out towards the other. The way out of 
my own suffering is to attend to that of the other, such that ‘a beyond appears in the form of 
the interhuman’ (Levinas, 2006: 80). It feels awful to put yourself in a vulnerable position and 
then to be hurt in the process, but it can be redeemed by going out and helping the vulnerable 
and the hurting – whoever they are and whatever the cause. The experience of one’s own 
suffering is then no longer passive but instead mobilises an attempt to transform the other’s 
experience of suffering. In this way romantic suffering avoids its uselessness by becoming an 
attention to the suffering of others. 
 
On the second count, the idea that love for the neighbour was merely a particular cultural 
imperative, and not an expression of human existence itself, might lead us to a despondent 
nostalgia when we ought to look, instead, to conceptualisations of love that would challenge 
the injunction to consume or to accumulate or to otherwise reduce the intersubjective to the 
transactional. Weber’s account of how the ‘unbrotherliness’ (1958: 330) of the capitalist spirit 
– with its rationalising and individualising impetus – diminished the cultural valence of 
brotherly or neighbourly love is important, as are the elaborations of this theme by Giddens 
and by Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, but if we regard love as a social code and not as 
intersubjective existence, and if we take this charitable love to have been only a fleeting cultural 
mode, then we are limited to charting its passing. The analysis then focuses on what has passed, 
without looking to what is buried alive by the kinds of imperatives O’Neill and Illouz 
document. Love Island would then stand moribundly as a sign of the times, an articulation of 
all that is wrong with love today, when it ought to remind us instead that the cultural demands 
of love are never settled, precisely because these imperatives run up against love as our very 
being. This would then give us an idea of the future beyond the narrow economic framing of 
relationships.  
 
‘Justice comes from love’, says Levinas (2008b: 92). But under the logic of the market, any 
kind of asymmetrical love is seen as a sunk cost; under these conditions, love for the neighbour 
would be a moral failure rather than an initiation of moral responsibility. We can see this play 
out in the responses to rejection and displays of frustrated love on Love Island. The idea that 
love is a kind of possession blinds us to the real value in giving – emotionally and materially – 
without receiving in kind. This is lost if we read Love Island simply as an epitaph for a 
charitable love now gone, and not as a representation of how the value of grafting and an 





Wes, an electrical and nuclear systems design engineer from Staffordshire, coupled with Laura 
A on day one. They remained together until Wes decided to break things off, coming to this 
decision after a conversation with his friend Josh where he offered, rhetorically, that ‘I am 
happy, but could I be happier?’ Laura A then got with Jack on day thirty and Wes coupled up 
with Megan three days later. Laura A’s new partner then quickly found himself attracted to 
new arrival Laura C. Jack sat down with Wes and Josh to talk about his feelings for the two 
Lauras. Josh, repeating the earlier reasoning of Wes, asked Jack: ‘You and Laura [A] are 
happy, but could you be happier?’ Wes advised: ‘I know you’re attracted to Laura [A], but if 
you’re attracted to someone else, you’re more attracted to someone else: don’t live the lie’. 
Jack dumped Laura A on day forty-seven to get with Laura C, but they were voted off the Island 
by viewers six days later. Wes and Megan made the final where they finished fourth. Over the 
course of the series Laura A found herself dumped by two men both claiming to be happy with 
her but in pursuit of greater happiness elsewhere; she eventually partnered with Paul and 
finished as runner up. 
 
Narcissism is held to be a wholly negative orientation to others when it might be seen to play 
a more vital role in moral life. The idea that a degree of narcissism is a necessary condition of 
being with others is perhaps best encapsulated by Derrida (2004: 199), who writes: 
 
Narcissism! There is not narcissism and non-narcissism; there are narcissisms that are 
more or less comprehensive, generous, open, extended. What is called non-narcissism 
is in general but the economy of a much more welcoming, hospitable narcissism, one 
that is much more open to the experience of the other as other. 
 
Levinas advances a similar idea in his work on dwelling and recollection. ‘Recollection’, writes 
Levinas (2007: 154), ‘designates a suspension of the immediate reactions the world solicits in 
view of a greater attention to oneself, one’s possibilities, and the situation’. This means drawing 
yourself together so that you are better able to go towards others; feeling at home with yourself 
so that you are ready to offer hospitality. In a moment of ‘tranquillity’ we repose as if in a ‘still-
life’ (Levinas, 2007: 158), a necessary condition that presupposes moral responsibility, but one 
that we must always already be moving away from and towards others if we are to exist 
socially. Recollection is the punctuation that makes responsibility possible, at once a pause for 
breath and the disambiguation of moral existence. It is possible, Levinas (2007: 173) notes, for 
this to go too far, into egoism, but without such a possibility it would not be possible to go 
freely the other way, toward the other, and embrace moral responsibility. Some degree of 
narcissism is essential to the relationship between self-identity and intersubjectivity. As a 
variety of self-care, or recollection, it makes possible care for others. Narcissism, as such, is 
vital to both love between lovers and love for the neighbour. ‘Recollection’ – or responsible 
narcissism – ‘coincides with the Desire for the Other absolutely transcendent’ (Levinas, 2007: 
172). It allows us to go beyond the secure individuality of the present and towards the 
spontaneous futurity of the other.  
 
Illouz (2018: 78) characterises the kind of commitment-phobia shown on Love Island as 
‘hedonistic’, where commitment is deferred to pursue pleasurable short-term relationships 
rather than out of an inability to commit. Romantic commitment is then reframed as a limitation 
of opportunity for self-gratification. O’Neill (2018: 30) sees this as a reflection of the 
lionisation of the entrepreneurial subject under conditions of neoliberalism. Such a subject is 
encouraged to see romantic relationships as a kind of accumulation that drives the sense that 
you ought never to be happy with what you have previously banked. But if there is no such 
thing as non-narcissism, it is at least prudent to suggest that narcissism fares badly under an 
economic logic that encourages us to consider every facet of our lives in terms of accumulation. 
Richard Sennett (2002: 326-327) argues that we see narcissism as a personal failing when really 
it is more of a social norm in a society that promotes individualism whilst withdrawing stability 
or security. The trick is to hold both that narcissism is an unwelcome social norm and that it is 
bound up with sociality or the intersubjective relation – it is just a question of what imperative 
it is directed towards serving. We could then say that narcissisms that are less generous, open 
and extended – which might include continually dumping your partners to trade up, as Wes 
and Jack appeared to do – shift the balance away from narcissisms that are vital to moral life.  
 
In this light, the kind of criticisms levelled at the participants on Love Island appear misplaced. 
It is no doubt possible to read the Islanders as pop cultural avatars of a neoliberal age of love 
and to hold the show responsible for the reproduction of its sufferings. Bauman, for example, 
saw ‘the fluid world of EastEnders’, the British soap opera, as a ‘hothouse’ of floating and frail 
relationships (Bauman, 2003: 76) and argued that reality shows like Big Brother or game shows 
like The Weakest Link teach us that the other person is not to be trusted, that they were ‘public 
rehearsals of the disposability of humans’ (88). But if we place narcissism on the continuum 
of love and not as its opposite, if we see both narcissism and love in terms of irreducible social 
being, then we would be more open to the idea that what is communicated culturally can be 
recalibrated. As Bernard Stiegler (2009: 48) sees it, the narcissism that forms the 
intersubjective relation stands opposed to the false individuality of consumerism, which cannot 
allow for the individual to flourish if it cannot allow for love to bloom. Lasch’s narcissist, in 
lack of loyalty and in no need of community, does not ultimately suffer from their narcissism 
but from an empty individualism, an individualist ethos that rides roughshod over responsible 
narcissism.  
 
Lasch (1991: xvi) argues that the ‘narcissist has no interest in the future because, in part, he 
has so little interest in the past’, that the narcissist has rejected the possibility that the old ways 
are the best. But too much of this kind of thinking in any historical account of cultural change 
risks refusing the idea that things can be otherwise than now or then. In an odd quirk, the 
historical sociological accounts of love ultimately cannot give us what an idea of love as a 
singular event can, which is of a relationship with alterity that takes us beyond the present. 
Narcissism rehabilitated in line with this idea of love is an orientation towards the future insofar 
as it prepares us for a world of others. The problem is not so much that the contestants on Love 
Island are narcissistic, but that the cultural imperative is to point our narcissism in the wrong 
direction. The way out of this points forwards and not backwards, which is to say that we need 
to work with an idea of narcissism that can be positively future-oriented, to not dismiss 





The idea of love advanced throughout this article has been as an event or encounter such that: 
romantic love is an opening on to moral life; moral life is enacted through a love for the 
neighbour that constitutes and animates our being in the world; and narcissism balanced 
between inwardness and openness is vital to the commencement of moral life. Carried along 
with this conceptualisation of love has been an argument that love is not only a cultural code 
with a historically specific instantiation but, underneath all this, a moral imperative of 
existence. So: where does this leave us when it comes to thinking about reality television? 
 
Research on reality television has highlighted the way that its production shapes reductive 
representations of identities and relationships (Allen et al., 2014; de Benedictus et al., 2017); 
that it facilitates the performance of ritualised behaviours that reinforce dominant cultural 
norms (Couldry and Littler, 2011; Hill, 2015); and that it intervenes in and visualises moral 
subject formation according to dominant value systems (Skeggs, 2009; Tyler, 2013). Reality 
television has been shown to promote a neoliberal ideal of the self-governing subject (Wood, 
2017); its emotional content is often centred on romantic and sexual relationships (Aslama and 
Pantti, 2006); and, by extension, it presents identities and relationships as something 
marketized and that one invests in (Lewis, 2017). Dating shows are often constructed to situate 
ordinary people in extraordinary circumstances (Syvertsen, 2001), providing contingent and 
risky environments to the extent that they destabilise individual identities, but in ways that 
reinforce an extant governmental ideology of relationships (Wang, 2017). Programmes like 
Love Island are fertile ground for a critique of the social production of romantic troubles 
precisely because the mediation of relationships participates in the production of the norms that 
shape them.  
 
It is hoped that future work on reality television can build more concretely on the tension 
highlighted here between love as a cultural imperative and love as a singular event indicative 
of moral existence. Aslama and Pantti (2006) have argued that watching participants find love 
on television, in such artificial scenarios, provides a context in which emotional extremes might 
be considered normal. Nevertheless, these extremes bring to the fore the faults and 
indeterminacies in our conceptions of love and romance, and this article has sought to locate, 
as Alison Hearn (2017: 21) puts it, ‘the alienating weight of cultural and economic commands 
being silently imposed’, and to register its impact on a life lived for others. 
 
Ultimately, popular culture does not simply capture how love is, however real or constructed 
its scenes may be. As Secomb (2007: 159) indicates, the displays of love on these shows remain 
as unsettled as love itself and, in their incompleteness, open on to an understanding of love 
rather than foreclosing what it might mean. Theories and concepts entwine with these stories 
and together unravel our certainties about love. We are left with an idea of love, through a 
reading of the work of Levinas, that would embrace the uncertainty of life, of a life lived with 
others, but that is diverted or diffused or defeated by the cultural commands of an individualised 
and then neoliberalised society. When analysing shows like Love Island we can then assess the 
story they tell us about moral life now, without moralising about the participants or those they 
stand in for, and without reducing them to dupes of the culture. The death of former presenter 
Caroline Flack, coming after those of participants Sophie Gradon (series two) and Mike 
Thalassitis (series three), has raised a question mark over whether the series will – or should – 
continue (Jonze, 2020). But whether Love Island or other reality formats that centre on 
romance, there is a need to speak critically and carefully with these popular representations of 
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